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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
sustained, on a narrow ground, by reading this option clause as
in pari materia with the vacancy clause, and thereby limiting the
latter. The insured could not repair the building without trenching on the right of the insurer until its option was exercised. The
vacancy clause would thus not be operative before action on the
option clause. Since the insurer had notice of the first fire, and
perhaps did not wish to continue the insurance he could, when
the forty day period expired, have canceled the policy. Not having done so, the policy should remain in effect.'
The court, however, goes on a broader ground: namely, that
the parties contracted on the basis of the house being inhabitable.
This reasoning would apply, no matter for what reason the house
was vacated, if it, in fact, were uninhabitable." This probably
exceeds the bounds of construction but the burden of risk is not
a reasonable one. It should be noticed that such a rule increases
the burden on the court and defense counsel since inhabitability
is a variable matter of proof.
-FpxDERICK W. FORD.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE -

2MUST

PLAINTIFF PLEAD ADEQUACY

oF CONsmERATION? - The plaintiff, C, instituted an action against
W, administrator of the estate of S, for the specific performance
of an oral agreement between C and S, whereby the latter
promised to devise property to the former if the plaintiff would
come and live with her and assist her in domestic affairs and bring
J, the plaintiff's husband, to assist her in her business affairs.
C performed in full but S died without having made the proposed
will. The petition alleged in detail extensive services claimed to
be as valuable as the property decedent had agreed to devise
petitioner. Held: The failure to allege the value of the services
rendered by the plaintiff to the deceased, or the value of the land
f the company did not have notice of the damage it is suggested that
they should be given a reasonable length of time to cancel the policy. Where
the second fire destroys the house after the vacancy clause expires, but before notice, probably the insured should bear the loss.
0 Gash v. Home Ins. Co. of N. Y., 153 Ill. App. 31 (1910). In this case,
a flood damaged the property and the day before the insured moved back
to the house, which was after the vacancy clause elapsed, the house was
destroyed by fire. The insured recovered even though there had been no
notice of the vacancy.
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RECENT CASE COMMENTS

which the plaintiff was to receive, warranted a refusal to decree
specific performance of the contract. Huggins v. Meriweather.1
The weight of authority does not permit a court of equity to
refuse a decree for specific performance on account of mere inadequacy of consideration 2 Mere inadequacy is not even a
defense. The defendant must allege other elements making out
hardship or oppression.' In some jurisdictions it isnot necessary
to allege the value of the services and of the property in a petition for specific performance of an agreement to devise land in
consideration of personal services, where the plaintiff had rendered the services, and in such cases the court will not inquire
into the adequacy of the consideration. But, by statute in California and Georgia, inadequacy of consideration is alone sufficient
to justify a court of equity in refusing to decree specific performance;' by statute in Montana and South Dakota, the consideration must be adequate;' and by judicial decision in Alabama
and South Carolina, mere inadequacy of consideration is sufficient
to constitute a basis for the denial of specific performance.'
1170 S. E. 485 (Ga. 1933). The court follows prior cases in Georgia docided upon the Code of Georgia. The Statute of Frauds is not considered.
Two
2 judges dissent to the holding in this case.
Morrison v. Peay, 21 Ark. 110 (1860); Pestal v. O'Donnell, 81 Colo.
202, 254 Pac. 764 (1927); Kuehule v. Augustin, 333 fI1. 31, 164 N. . 194
(1928); Warner v. Marshall, 166 Ind. 88, 75 N. E. 582 (1905); Scott v.
Habinck, 188 Ia. 155, 174 N. W. 1 (1919) ; Greenwood v. Greenwood, 906Kan.
591, 152 Pac. 657 (1915); Durnell v. Alexander, 178 Ky. 404, 199 S. W. 17
(1917); Warren Manufacturing Co. of Baltimore County v. Mayor, etc. of
the City of Baltimore, 119 Md. 188, 86 Atl. 502 (1913); Woodworth v.
Porter, 224 Mich. 470, 194 N. W. 1015 (1923); Moore v. McKillip, 110 Neb.
575, 194 X. W. 465 (1923) ; Ward v. Albertson, 165 N. C. 218, 81 S. . 168
(1914); Sweeney v. Brow, 35 R. I. 227, 86 Atl. 115 (1913); Garton v. Layton, 76 W. Va. 63, 84 S. E. 1058 (1915); Barrett v. Miner, 119 Misc. Bep.
230, 196 N. Y. S.175 (1922).
8Saint v. Beal, 66 Mont. 292, 213 Pac. 248 (1923); Sturtz v. Ommen, 32
S. D. 396, 143 N. W. 288 (1913).
'Colby v. Street, 146 Minn. 290, 178 N. W. 599 (1920); Burns v. Smith,
21 Mont. 251, 53 Pac. 742 (1898); Pemberton v. Pemberton's Heirs, 76
Neb. 669, 107 N. W. 996 (1906), Barrett v. Miner, supra, n. 4; Winne v.
Winne, 166 N. Y. 263, 59 N. E. 832 (1901).
Civ. CODE OF CAL. (1931) § 3391, par. 1 and 2; Cornblith v. Valentine,
211 Cal. 243, 294 Pac. 1065 (1930); GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) § 4673:
"Mere inadequacy of consideration, though not sufficient to rescind the contract, may justify a court in refusing to decree a specific performance; so
also any other fact showing the contract to be unfair or against good conscience. I I

6Other statutes provide that the vendor must receive adequate considoration. S. D. REv. CODE (1919) § 2345, applied in Phelan v. Neary, 22 S.D.
265, 117 N. W. 142 (1908); MONT. CODE OP CIv. PRoo. (1921) § 4417, applied in Finlen v. Heinze, 28 Mont. 548, 73 Pac. 123 (1903).
Gasque v. Small, 21 S. C. Eq. 71 (1848); Andrews v. Andrews, 28 Ala.
432 (1856). Cf. Norris v. Clark, 72 N. H. 442, 57 Atl. 334 (1904): "Although
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Thus the Georgia court requires that the value of the land
and the value and extent of the services be alleged in the bill to
enable the chancellor to determine the question of adequacy.8 That
notion is hardly persuasive. If the burden is imposed on the defendant he can allege the facts relative to adequacy of consideration. The very language of the Georgia Code, that "mere inadequacy .. . . may justify a court in refusing to decree a specific
performance", seems to assume that adequacy is not a part of
plaintiff's case since the court "may" rely on inadequacy to deny
relief. The only sound basis for relying on inadequacy of consideration in resisting specific performance is a combination of
unfairness and hardship,' and it depends upon the particular
transaction whether inadequacy even suggests such a combination.
If the plaintiff has a binding contract supported by a consideration and the legal remedy is inadequate it seems both logical and
just to impose the burden of establishing special objections to
specific relief upon the defendant.n
-EDWARD S. BOCK, JR.

USURY

-

INSURANCE -

REQUIRING BORROWER TO TAKE LIFE

Proceedings
were begun to enjoin a sale under a deed of trust and to purge
INSURANCE POLICY TO BE USED AS COLLATERAL. -

mere inadequacy of price, independent of other circumstances, is not of itself
stay the exercise of its
sufficient to set aside a transaction, yet it may .....
How(equity's) power to enforce the specific performance of a contract."
ever, the court did not depend upon mere inadequacy of consideration alone.
'In addition to the principal case see Shropshire v. Rainey, 150 Ga. 566,
104 S. E. 414 (1920); Potts v. Mathis, 147 Ga. 495, 100 S. E. 110 (1919).
"In the absence of allegations.., as to the value of the lands, or of the value
and extent of the services alleged as the consideration of the contract, it is
impossible for a court to determine whether the services performed constituted
an adequate or grossly inadequate price for the estate of the person with whom
the alleged contract was made; nor could it be determined, in the absence of
such essentials, whether the contract was unfair, or unjust, or against good conscience." Flood v. Templeton, 148 Cal. 374, 83 Pac. 148 (1905) (The complaint
or petition must show the adequacy of the consideration). Contra: Finlen v.
Heinze, supra n. 6 (The burden of proof is on the party resisting specific
performance, and though inadequacy of consideration alone is a defense,
complete in itself, adequacy of the price or consideration need not be
alleged); Saint v. Beal, supra n. 3.
Harrison v. Town, 17 Mo. 237 (1852), quoted in WALSH, Equity
0See
(1930) 482, n. 34.
"There is no sound reason why equity should refuse to enforce a contract
under seal enforceable at law but that is the case. See Pound, Consideration
in ,quity (1919) 13 ILL. L. REv. 667. Cf. Fletcher v. Pletcher, 4 Hare 67
(1844).
Bauermeister v. Sullivan, 87 Ind. App. 628, 160 N. E. 105 (1928).
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